Mind-brain correlation thesis

I found that the woman switched directions when I would read the text underneath the picture. Then I realized my brain was taking cues from the extended leg in relation to the central axis and the following movement to determine which way she was “spinning”. So I tried focusing on her foot and blinking when her body would be turned “sideways” to the screen and it would switch immediately…it was pretty cool. have fun!

What are little boys made of ?
Snips and snails and puppy dog’s tails
THAT’s what little boys are made of!

Tell us what you think of ScienceDaily -- we welcome both positive and negative comments. Have any problems using the site? Questions?

Another popular strategy for preserving Type Identity in the face of multiple realization is to allow for the existence of disjunctive physical kinds. By defining types of physical states in terms of disjunctions of two or more physical "realizers," the correlation of one such realizer with a particular (type) mental state is sufficient. The search for species- or system-specific identities is thereby rendered unnecessary, as mental states such as pain could eventually be identified with the (potentially infinite) disjunctive physical state of, say, c-fiber excitation (in humans), d-fiber excitation (in mollusks), and e-network state (in a robot). In "The Nature of Mental States," Putnam dismisses the disjunctive strategy out of hand, without saying why he thinks the physical-chemical brain states to be posited in identity claims must be uniquely specifiable. Fodor (in 1974) and Jaegwon Kim (1992), both former students of Putnam, tried coming to his rescue by producing independent arguments which purport to show that disjunctions of physical realizers cannot themselves be kinds. Whereas Fodor concluded that "reductionism... flies in the face of the facts," however, Kim concluded that psychology is open to sundering "by being multiply locally reduced."

Plato makes it clear, in the Phaedo , that the Forms are the universalia ante res , . they are ideal universals, by which we are able to understand the world. In his allegory of the cave Plato likens the achievement of philosophical understanding to emerging into the sun from a dark cave, where only vague shadows of what lies beyond that prison are cast dimly upon the wall. Plato's forms are non-physical and non-mental. They exist nowhere in time or space, but neither do they exist in the mind, nor in the pleroma of matter; rather, matter is said to "participate" in form (μεθεξις methexis ). It remained unclear however, even to Aristotle, exactly what Plato intended by that.

Copyright 2017 Federation of Associations in Behavioral & Brain Sciences. All rights reserved.

Learn more

mind-brain correlation thesis

Mind-brain correlation thesis

Another popular strategy for preserving Type Identity in the face of multiple realization is to allow for the existence of disjunctive physical kinds. By defining types of physical states in terms of disjunctions of two or more physical "realizers," the correlation of one such realizer with a particular (type) mental state is sufficient. The search for species- or system-specific identities is thereby rendered unnecessary, as mental states such as pain could eventually be identified with the (potentially infinite) disjunctive physical state of, say, c-fiber excitation (in humans), d-fiber excitation (in mollusks), and e-network state (in a robot). In "The Nature of Mental States," Putnam dismisses the disjunctive strategy out of hand, without saying why he thinks the physical-chemical brain states to be posited in identity claims must be uniquely specifiable. Fodor (in 1974) and Jaegwon Kim (1992), both former students of Putnam, tried coming to his rescue by producing independent arguments which purport to show that disjunctions of physical realizers cannot themselves be kinds. Whereas Fodor concluded that "reductionism... flies in the face of the facts," however, Kim concluded that psychology is open to sundering "by being multiply locally reduced."

Action Action

mind-brain correlation thesis

Mind-brain correlation thesis

Action Action

mind-brain correlation thesis

Mind-brain correlation thesis

Tell us what you think of ScienceDaily -- we welcome both positive and negative comments. Have any problems using the site? Questions?

Action Action

mind-brain correlation thesis
Mind-brain correlation thesis

Another popular strategy for preserving Type Identity in the face of multiple realization is to allow for the existence of disjunctive physical kinds. By defining types of physical states in terms of disjunctions of two or more physical "realizers," the correlation of one such realizer with a particular (type) mental state is sufficient. The search for species- or system-specific identities is thereby rendered unnecessary, as mental states such as pain could eventually be identified with the (potentially infinite) disjunctive physical state of, say, c-fiber excitation (in humans), d-fiber excitation (in mollusks), and e-network state (in a robot). In "The Nature of Mental States," Putnam dismisses the disjunctive strategy out of hand, without saying why he thinks the physical-chemical brain states to be posited in identity claims must be uniquely specifiable. Fodor (in 1974) and Jaegwon Kim (1992), both former students of Putnam, tried coming to his rescue by producing independent arguments which purport to show that disjunctions of physical realizers cannot themselves be kinds. Whereas Fodor concluded that "reductionism... flies in the face of the facts," however, Kim concluded that psychology is open to sundering "by being multiply locally reduced."

Action Action

Mind-brain correlation thesis

Action Action

mind-brain correlation thesis

Mind-brain correlation thesis

What are little boys made of ?
Snips and snails and puppy dog’s tails
THAT’s what little boys are made of!

Action Action

mind-brain correlation thesis

Mind-brain correlation thesis

Tell us what you think of ScienceDaily -- we welcome both positive and negative comments. Have any problems using the site? Questions?

Action Action

mind-brain correlation thesis

Mind-brain correlation thesis

Action Action

Bootstrap Thumbnail Second

Mind-brain correlation thesis

Plato makes it clear, in the Phaedo , that the Forms are the universalia ante res , . they are ideal universals, by which we are able to understand the world. In his allegory of the cave Plato likens the achievement of philosophical understanding to emerging into the sun from a dark cave, where only vague shadows of what lies beyond that prison are cast dimly upon the wall. Plato's forms are non-physical and non-mental. They exist nowhere in time or space, but neither do they exist in the mind, nor in the pleroma of matter; rather, matter is said to "participate" in form (μεθεξις methexis ). It remained unclear however, even to Aristotle, exactly what Plato intended by that.

Action Action

Bootstrap Thumbnail Third

Mind-brain correlation thesis

Action Action